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Individually-Rational Collective Choice under Random Preferences

Sábado, 1 Febrero 2003

In this paper I consider the following problem: there is a collection of exogenously given socially feasible sets, and for each one of them, each one of a group of individuals chooses from an individually feasible set. The fact that the product of the ind

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