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Principal-Agent Problem with Minimum Performance Insurance: The Case of Mandatory Individual Pension Accounts

Jueves, 1 Enero 2009

A minimum performance insurance in the Principal-Agent problem is wealth reducing to the principal. This result points to further inefficiencies in mandatory individual Pension Funds' contracts, particularly the one established in the 1993's 100th Law in

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