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Transparency : can central banks commit to truthful communication?

Martes, 1 Mayo 2012

To evaluate whether transparency is beneficial, it is usual to assume that the central bank may choose one of two options, opacity versus truthful communication. However, the monetary policymaker may have incentives to misrepresent private information so

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