Número:
760
Publicado:
Clasificación JEL:
D44, G18, G28
Palabras clave:
Auctions, government bond markets, uniform-price auctions, discriminatory- price auctions
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The paper examines the bidders behaviour in the Colombian government bond auctions during 2007 for the period in which there is no uncertainty in the supply. Three main findings are presented. First, in contrast with other treasury auctions (Castellanos [