Abstract: We examine the preferences of low-income households in Kenya over the structure of unconditional cash transfers. We find, first, that most prefer lumpier transfers, and many prefer delayed receipt—unlike the structures typical of safety-net programs, but consistent with evidence on the financial challenges of poverty. Second, poverty itself affects preferences: a little more financial slack when deciding increases desired delay. Finally, financial slack pays back: some delay—aligning transfers better with the seasonal cycle—increases deliberation, income, and goal progress 1.5 years later. Adapting cash transfer design to recipients’ decision-making environment could improve their financial choices and outcomes.

Presenter: Paul Niehaus.

Paul Niehaus is an economist and entrepreneur working to accelerate the end of extreme poverty.

He is Chancellor's Associates Endowed Chair in Economics at UC San Diego and an affiliate of BREAD, CEGA, J-PAL, and the NBER. His research examines the design, implementation, and impact of anti-poverty programs at large scales.

Paul is a recipient of a Sloan Fellowship and has been named a “Top 100 Global Thinker” by Foreign Policy magazine. He holds a PhD in economics from Harvard University. See more at https://econweb.ucsd.edu/~pniehaus/

Idioma: Inglés
Tiempo de exposición: 1 hora