Usted está aquí

Back to top

Individually-Rational Collective Choice under Random Preferences

Sábado, 1 Febrero 2003

In this paper I consider the following problem: there is a collection of exogenously given socially feasible sets, and for each one of them, each one of a group of individuals chooses from an individually feasible set. The fact that the product of the ind

Autores

Autores:

Lo más reciente

Eliana Rocío González-Molano, Ramón Eduardo Hernández-Ortega, Edgar Caicedo-García, Nicolás Martínez-Cortés, José Vicente Romero-Chamorro, Anderson Grajales
Knight Brian, Knight Brian, Ana María Tribín-Uribe
Leonardo Bonilla-Mejía, Leonardo Fabio Morales-Zurita, Didier Hermida Giraldo, Luz Adriana Flórez