Número:
546
Publicado:
Clasificación JEL:
D86, D82, G23
Palabras clave:
Incentives, Agency Theory, Pensions
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A minimum performance insurance in the Principal-Agent problem is wealth reducing to the principal. This result points to further inefficiencies in mandatory individual Pension Funds' contracts, particularly the one established in the 1993's 100th Law in