Borradores de Economia
Número:
546
Publicado:
Clasificación JEL:
D86, D82, G23
Palabras clave:
Incentives, Agency Theory, Pensions
Lo más reciente
Jhorland Ayala-García, Yesica Tatiana Lara-Silva, Alejandro Alberto Vargas-Villamil, Lina Romero-Chaparro
Jesús Alonso Botero-García, Ligia Alba Melo-Becerra, Cristian Castrillón Gaviria, Daniela Gallo
Hernando Vargas-Herrera
A minimum performance insurance in the Principal-Agent problem is wealth reducing to the principal. This result points to further inefficiencies in mandatory individual Pension Funds' contracts, particularly the one established in the 1993's 100th Law in