Documentos de Trabajo Sobre Economía Regional y Urbana - Staying in Power: How Does Political Continuity Shape Debt?

Documentos de Trabajo sobre Economía Regional y Urbana
Number: 
331
Published: 
Classification JEL: 
P25, H63, H72, D72
Keywords: 
Public finances (21884), Local Debt (24630), Political Processes (24631), Elections and Voting Behavior (24632)

The most recent

María Teresa Ramírez-Giraldo, Karina Acosta, Olga Lucia Acosta Navarro, Lucia Arango-Lozano, Fernando Arias-Rodríguez, Oscar Iván Ávila-Montealegre, Oscar Reinaldo Becerra Camargo, Leonardo Bonilla-Mejía, Grey Yuliet Ceballos-Garcia, Luz Adriana Flórez, Juan Miguel Gallego-Acevedo, Luis Armando Galvis-Aponte, Luis M. García-Pulgarín, Andrés Felipe García-Suaza, Anderson Grajales, Daniela Gualtero-Briceño, Didier Hermida-Giraldo, Ana María Iregui-Bohórquez, Juliana Jaramillo-Echeverri, Karen Laguna-Ballesteros, Francisco Javier Lasso-Valderrama, Daniel Márquez, Carlos Alberto Medina-Durango, Ligia Alba Melo-Becerra, María Fernanda Meneses-González, Juan José Ospina-Tejeiro, Andrea Sofía Otero-Cortés, Daniel Parra-Amado, Juana Piñeros-Ruiz, Christian Manuel Posso-Suárez, Natalia Ramírez-Bustamante, Mario Andrés Ramos-Veloza, Jorge Leonardo Rodríguez-Arenas, Alejandro Sarasti-Sierra, Bibiana Taboada-Arango, Ana María Tribín-Uribe, Juanita Villaveces
Wilmer Martinez-Rivera, Manuel Darío Hernández-Bejarano
Carlos David Ardila-Dueñas, Joel Santiago Castellanos-Caballero, Carlos David Murcia-Bustos

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between political continuity and public municipal debt in Colombia, highlighting how political cycles influence fiscal behavior at the subnational level. Unlike national cycles, local political dynamics, marked by consecutive electoral victories of the same party, significantly impact fiscal policy and debt accumulation. Using a Kink Regression Discontinuity design, we explore the effects of these electoral outcomes on public financial debt. Our findings reveal that municipalities governed by the same party or coalition across successive elections exhibit a 0.25% increase in debt levels for every percentage point increase in their election win margin. This trend becomes more pronounced over time, with debt levels peaking in election years. The robustness of our results is confirmed through various bandwidths and placebo tests, which include random shuffling of electoral outcomes and reassignment of electoral results from different years. Our study contributes to the understanding of how political stability or continuity can shape fiscal outcomes at the regional level, a topic that has received limited attention in the political economy literature.

“Political stability or continuity can shape fiscal outcomes at the regional level, a topic that has received little attention in the political economy literature."