Individually-Rational Collective Choice under Random Preferences

Borradores de Economia
Number: 
232
Published: 
Classification JEL: 
D70, D74, D12
Keywords: 
Human capital agglomeration, Social returns, Private returns, Externalities, Uncertainty, Fiscal policy

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