Borradores de Economia
Número:
349
Publicado:
Clasificación JEL:
H11, D73, D74, D78, D30
Palabras clave:
Populism, oligarchy, democracy, conflict
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Anne Brockmeyer, Francois Gerard, Gabriel Ulyssea, Linda Wu, Marcelo Bergolo, Rodrigo Ceni González, Bernard Kirui, Andrea Lopez-Luzuriaga, Leonardo Fabio Morales, Andrea Sofía Otero-Cortés, Nadine Riedel, Matias Tapia, Tanisa Tawichsri, Verena Wiedemann
Marlon Salazar, Andrés Salazar-Mejía, Jorge Daniel Guevara-Acevedo, Juan David Duitama-Correa
Aarón Levi Garavito-Acosta, Wilmer Martinez-Rivera, Camilo González-Sabogal, Johanna Barbosa-Buitrago, Nathaly Vergel-Serrano
This paper develops a political economy model that provides an explanation as for why ruling elites in oligarchic societies may rely on income redistribution to the poor (the masses) in order to prevent them from attempting a revolution. We refer to this