Principal-Agent Problem with Minimum Performance Insurance: The Case of Mandatory Individual Pension Accounts

Juan Manuel Julio-Román

Number:

546

Published:

Thursday, 1 January 2009

Classification JEL:

D86, D82, G23

Keywords:

Human capital agglomeration, Social returns, Private returns, Externalities, Uncertainty, Fiscal policy

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A minimum performance insurance in the Principal-Agent problem is wealth reducing to the principal. This result points to further inefficiencies in mandatory individual Pension Funds' contracts, particularly the one established in the 1993's 100th Law in