Transparency : can central banks commit to truthful communication?

Borradores de Economia
Number: 
711
Published: 
Classification JEL: 
E52, E58, D82
Keywords: 
Human capital agglomeration, Social returns, Private returns, Externalities, Uncertainty, Fiscal policy
Download document

The most recent

Determinants and Forecasting of Colombia's Current Account
Aarón Levi Garavito-Acosta, Wilmer Martinez-Rivera, Camilo González-Sabogal, Johanna Barbosa-Buitrago, Nathaly Vergel-Serrano
Density Estimation and Specification Testing for Nonparametric Regression Models
Zhibiao Zhao, Manuel Darío Hernández-Bejarano
Monitoring the Housing Market Cycle in Colombia: A Dynamic Factor Approach
Nicol Valeria Rodríguez-Rodríguez, Sebastián Quintero-Uribe, Johanna Barbosa-Buitrago

To evaluate whether transparency is beneficial, it is usual to assume that the central bank may choose one of two options, opacity versus truthful communication. However, the monetary policymaker may have incentives to misrepresent private information so