REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
Publicado:
Morales Juan S. Clasificación JEL:
D72, D73, H54, K13, R11
Lo más reciente
Jaime Alfredo Bonet-Moron, Jaime Andrés Collazos-Rodríguez, Karen Astrid Rubio-Ramírez, Adolfo Ramírez-Moreno, Andrés Felipe Parra-Solano
Julián Alonso Cárdenas-Cárdenas, Deicy Johana Cristiano-Botia, Eliana Rocío González-Molano, Carlos Alfonso Huertas-Campos
Luis E. Arango, Juan José Ospina-Tejeiro, Fernando Arias-Rodríguez, Oscar Iván Ávila-Montealegre, Jaime Andrés Collazos-Rodríguez, Diana M. Cortázar Gómez, Juan Pablo Cote-Barón, Julio Escobar-Potes, Aarón Levi Garavito-Acosta, Franky Juliano Galeano-Ramírez, Eliana Rocío González-Molano, Maria Camila Gomez Cardona, Anderson Grajales, David Camilo López-Valenzuela, Wilmer Martinez-Rivera, Nicolás Martínez-Cortés, Rocío Clara Alexandra Mora-Quiñones, Sara Naranjo-Saldarriaga, Antonio Orozco, Daniel Parra-Amado, Julián Pérez-Amaya, José Pulido, Karen L. Pulido-Mahecha, Carolina Ramírez-Rodríguez, Sergio Restrepo Ángel, José Vicente Romero-Chamorro, Nicol Valeria Rodríguez-Rodríguez, Norberto Rodríguez-Niño, Diego Hernán Rodríguez-Hernández, Carlos D. Rojas-Martínez, Johana Andrea Sanabria-Domínguez, Diego Vásquez-Escobar
This paper studies the executive-legislative exchange of centrally-allocated benefits (jam) for legislative support in Colombia using data from road building projects, legislative roll-call votes, and a leaked database which uncovered the assignment of road contracts to individual legislators. We draw hypotheses from a model in which an executive spreads jam to sway legislators. We document that assigned projects had excess costs, legislators targeted were more likely to be swing voters in congress, and legislators increased their support for the executive after their contracts were signed. The results are driven by legislators representing remote regions and constituencies with weaker political institutions.