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Testable Restrictions of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Domains

Miércoles, 1 Enero 2003

This paper studies the falsifiability of the hypothesis of Nash behavior, for the case of a finite number of players who choose from continuous domains, subject to constraints. The results obtained here are negative. Assuming the observation of finite dat

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