Borradores de Economia
Número:
229
Publicado:
Clasificación JEL:
C71, C72, C92, D70
Palabras clave:
Game theory, testable restrictions, Revealed preferences
Lo más reciente
Bernardo Romero-Torres, Gerson Javier Pérez-Valbuena, Andrés Felipe García-Suaza, Jaime Alfredo Bonet-Moron
Olga Lucia Acosta Navarro, Andrés Felipe Chitán-Caes, Ana María Iregui-Bohórquez, Ligia Alba Melo-Becerra, María Teresa Ramírez-Giraldo, Jorge Leonardo Rodríguez Arenas
Alejandro Ome, Laura Giles Álvarez, Gerson Javier Pérez-Valbuena, Cristhian Larrahondo
This paper studies the falsifiability of the hypothesis of Nash behavior, for the case of a finite number of players who choose from continuous domains, subject to constraints. The results obtained here are negative. Assuming the observation of finite dat