Testable Restrictions of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Domains

Número: 
229
Publicado: 
Clasificación JEL: 
C71, C72, C92, D70
Palabras clave: 
Game theory, testable restrictions, Revealed preferences

Lo más reciente

Karina Acosta, Juliana Jaramillo-Echeverri, Daniel Lasso Jaramillo, Alejandro Sarasti-Sierra
Ligia Alba Melo-Becerra, Diego Vásquez-Escobar, María Isabel Alarcón-Obando, Giselle Tatiana Silva-Samudio
Juan José Ospina-Tejeiro, Jorge Enrique Ramos-Forero, David Camilo López-Valenzuela, Yurany Hernández-Turca, Nicolle Valentina Herrera-Pinto

This paper studies the falsifiability of the hypothesis of Nash behavior, for the case of a finite number of players who choose from continuous domains, subject to constraints. The results obtained here are negative. Assuming the observation of finite dat