Testable Restrictions of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Domains

Borradores de Economia
Número: 
229
Publicado: 
Clasificación JEL: 
C71, C72, C92, D70
Palabras clave: 
Game theory, testable restrictions, Revealed preferences

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This paper studies the falsifiability of the hypothesis of Nash behavior, for the case of a finite number of players who choose from continuous domains, subject to constraints. The results obtained here are negative. Assuming the observation of finite dat