Borradores de Economia
Número:
546
Publicado:
Clasificación JEL:
D86, D82, G23
Palabras clave:
Incentives, Agency Theory, Pensions
Lo más reciente
Diana Ricciulli-Marin, Mateo Uribe-Castro
Ana María Iregui-Bohórquez, Ligia Alba Melo-Becerra, María Teresa Ramírez-Giraldo, Jorge Leonardo Rodríguez Arenas
Francisco Javier Lasso-Valderrama, Carmiña Ofelia Vargas-Riaño
A minimum performance insurance in the Principal-Agent problem is wealth reducing to the principal. This result points to further inefficiencies in mandatory individual Pension Funds' contracts, particularly the one established in the 1993's 100th Law in