Transparency : can central banks commit to truthful communication?

Borradores de Economia
Número: 
711
Publicado: 
Clasificación JEL: 
E52, E58, D82
Palabras clave: 
Central Bank Announcements, Monetary policy, Transparency

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To evaluate whether transparency is beneficial, it is usual to assume that the central bank may choose one of two options, opacity versus truthful communication. However, the monetary policymaker may have incentives to misrepresent private information so